Factors of Village Cadres’ Incentive in Changwu County
Zhengbing Wang, Allan Rae, Weimin Cao, Zekui Ning
Abstract :At present, there is a few research literatures about village cadres’ incentive, mostly focusing on negative incentive of how to control village cadres. This paper studies village cadres’ incentive on three dimensions, including job-satisfaction evaluation, job-difficulty evaluation and job-retaining will. After analyzing the first investigated rural da
Key Words:Village Cadres, Incentive, Ordered Logistic Regression
1. Introduction
In China, there are 937.51million farmers (China Ministry of Agriculture, 2006). They live in many villages. In 2004, there are 652,718 administrative villages and over on
From 1958 to 1978, all village cadres were appointed by their superior governments, town governments. Every town government manages about 20 administrative villages. In this period, China was a planed economy country. All production plans of all production units are from superior organizations. All products belong to the state and were allotted by the state. Mostly all farmland , big tools and big animals in villages were belong to villages. A village was like a farm factory (Fairbanks, 1992). All activities of society and economy in villages were arranged by village cadres. Village cadres were managed by town governments that were named people’s communes (Wu, 2002). Villages are not on
Since 1978, series reforms were made in China rural (Kelliher, 1992). The most imp
In China, village cadres not on
In a village, there are two parts in village cadres. On
Village cadres have imp
Because village cadres’ works relate with villages’ development of society and economy, many researchers focus on the issue of Chinese village cadres. However, most of them study how to restrict bad behaviors of village cadres because bad behaviors such as corruptions, defalcations, extravagances, briberies and perverting the laws etc. ( Chen and Chun, 2004). A few researchers study how to inspire village cadres to work better. The inspiring mechanisms are as imp
In a long time,compensation is on
Strictly speaking, village cadres in China are neither employees nor officials. They are the people who live in rural area with wide peer network(Tsai, 2002 ; He,2000a). Their works are complicated and very imp
Zhang and Ning thought the most efficient way to prompt to work was to add village cadres’ wages because their wages were little and they were not rich (Zhang, 2005; Ning, 2005). The cadres needed more money to improve the level of their families’ lives. Wang said that power was an imp
Although there are many incentive measures, they are not clear which measures are good and which measures are better. We should know what the people that are inspired are more interested in (Stephen P. Robbins, 2001). This paper will study the problem.
To analyze this problem conveniently, from the da
The variables of incentive are nonrepresentational. In order to research the degrees of incentive, working positive are often used in measuring them. Based on the da
The structure of this paper:in the second part, the sources of investigation da
2. The sources of da
Surveys, financed by Program for New Century Excellent Talents in University and National Natural Science Foundation of China, was processed in Zhaoren Town and Dizhang Town ,Changwu county ,Shaanxi province ,China from 15—19 November, 2005. According to Changwu government website, target area is 567.1 square kilometers. Cultivated land is 19,933 acres, and its altitude is from 847 to 1274 meters. It is 180 kilometers from the county city to Xian city (capital city of Shaanxi Province). There are 14 towns and 235 administrative villages. Its population is 171 thousands and more than ninety percent population are farmers (156 thousands). Main crops are wheat and corn. GDP is 475 million RMB (US $59million) and financial income is 21.80million RMB (US $ 2.7 million) in 2004.
Table 1 Main variables in computation
Variables | Meaning of variables | Measure | N | Mean | Std. Dev. |
Variables of incentive |
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| |
Sat | Level of job- satisfaction | 1=Dissatisfaction,2=Commonly,3=Satisfaction | 93 | 2.538 | 0.563 |
Dif | Evaluation of job- difficulty | 1=easy,2=Commonly,3=more difficulty,4=Most difficulty | 100 | 3.230 | 0.664 |
Cont | Will of retaining job | 1=No,2=Unconcern,3=Yes | 98 | 1.980 | 0.849 |
Variables of individual character |
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| |
X1 | Age | Unit:year | 110 | 47.891 | 7.696 |
X2 | Education | Years of education,Unit:year | 94 | 9.255 | 2.309 |
X3 | Communist Party member | 1=Yes,0=No | 102 | 0.755 | 0.432 |
X4 | Population of family | Unit: people | 112 | 4.643 | 1.207 |
Variables of salary |
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| |
X5 | Nominal salary | Unit:RMB/year | 88 | 7662.636 | 5455.019 |
X6 | Paid percentage | Unit:% | 95 | 52.986 | 33.519 |
Variables of occupation reputation |
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X7 | Social reputation | 1=Reduction,2=No change,3=Improvement | 102 | 1.775 | 0.854 |
Variables of institution |
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X8 | Effect of institution | 1=Bad,2=Commonly,3=Good | 100 | 2.300 | 0.577 |
Note: N—number of samples. Some people surveyed did not answer some questions, so not all N are 112; Mean-mean value of all samples.
In Zhaoren Town, there are 27 administrative villages and average net income of farmers was 1934 yuan in 2004. In Dizhang Town, there are 27 administrative villages too and average net income of farmers was 1410 yuan in 2004. Average net income of Chinese farmers was 2936yuan in 2004.
Questionnaires and symposia were used in this survey. 128 questionnaires had been collected. Nevertheless, 112 of them could be used in this research. Those questionnaires involved with village cadres of 40 villages (17 villages belong to Zhaoren Town, 23 villages belong to Dizhang Town), included 2 developed villages, 17 developing villages and 21 underdeveloped villages.
We choose three indexes, level of job-satisfaction, evaluation of job- difficulty and will of retaining job, to denote incentive variables. The variables can show incentive level to village cadres. We choose 8 independent variables as influencing variables of village cadres’ positivities: village cadres’ age(X1), education years of village cadres(X2), village cadres are Communist Party members or no(X3), family population of village cadres(X4), village cadres’ nominal salary(X5), the rate of village cadres’ salary paid(X6), village cadres’ social reputation(X7) and the effects of village institutions and systems performed(X8). The variables are used in computation in table 1.
From table 1, we know that the village cadres had high level of job-satisfaction and the mean value of levels is 2.538 and Std. Dev. is 0.563, at on
3. Analysis Da
3.1 Non-parametric measure testing using Kendall's tau-b
The following table illustrates ordered variables. Kendall's tau-b test of non-parameters’ relativity can be used to test the da
From three indexes of level of job-satisfaction , evaluation of job- difficulty and will of retaining position in table 2, we can know that the village cadres have high level of satisfaction to their jobs and high level of job-difficulty that they think, so their will of retaining jobs are decrease. The village cadres surveyed, their age are old (average age 50 years), are mostly members of Communist Party (members 75.5 percent) and have less education years (average 9 years).They are found that at present village cadres’ nominal wages have big gap and low paid percentage. Therefore the village cadres think their social reputation has dropped.
Table 2 Test of non-parameters’ relativity (Kendall's tau_b coefficients)
| Sat | Dif | Cont | X1 | X2 | X3 | X4 | X5 | X6 | X7 | X8 |
Sat | 1.000 |
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Dif | -0.093 | 1.000 |
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Cont | 0.367** | -0.105 | 1.000 |
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X1 | 0.133 | 0.045 | -0.019 | 1.000 |
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X2 | -0.081 | 0.021 | -0.147 | -0.230** | 1.000 |
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X3 | 0.136 | -0.113 | -0.030 | 0.077 | 0.061 | 1.000 |
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X4 | 0.282** | 0.021 | 0.291** | 0.057 | -0.098 | -0.093 | 1.000 |
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X5 | 0.116 | 0.081 | 0.147* | -0.012 | -0.070 | 0.035 | 0.162* | 1.000 |
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X6 | 0.327** | -0.198** | 0.280** | 0.096 | -0.087 | -0.004 | 0.119 | 0.100 | 1.000 |
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X7 | 0.253** | -0.156* | 0.375** | 0.014 | -0.040 | -0.031 | 0.163* | 0.077 | 0.225** | 1.000 |
|
X8 | 0.506** | -0.064 | 0.282** | 0.001 | 0.138 | 0.159 | 0.152* | 0.195** | 0.108 | 0.280** | 1.000 |
Notes:**Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed);*Correlation is significant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed)。
The variables of the level of job- satisfaction and the will of job-retaining have positive correlations with the variables of family’s population, ration of salary paid, social reputation and institution. It demonstrates that the level of village cadres’ incentive will be improved if their family is getting bigger in terms of numbers of family member. The reason is that village cadres have more chances to meet local government officials and other imp
Evaluation of job-difficulty has remarkable association with the ration of salary paid and social reputation. By their correlation coefficient, we know that increasing ration of salary paid and improving social reputation can reduce the level of job-difficulty they evaluate.
3.2 Ordered Logistic Model
Because causal variables (the level of job-satisfaction, the evaluation of job-difficulty and the willingness of retaining job) in this paper are ordered variables, they are estimated by Ordered Regression Model(Gao,2006)。We use economical software package Eveiws4.0 to compute Ordered Logistic Model. The result is in table 3.
Table 3 The estimation result of Ordered Regression Model
| Sat | Dif | Cont | ||||||
coefficient | Z | P | coefficient | Z | P | coefficient | Z | P | |
X1 | -0.029 | -0.537 | 0.591 | -0.024 | -0.555 | 0.579 | -0.080 | -1.644 | 0.100 |
X2 | -0.253 | -1.395 | 0.163 | -0.047 | -0.336 | 0.737 | -0.324 | -2.097 | 0.036 |
X3 | 0.842 | 0.959 | 0.338 | -0.268 | -0.384 | 0.701 | -0.329 | -0.479 | 0.632 |
X4 | 0.641 | 2.063 | 0.039 | 0.236 | 0.939 | 0.348 | 0.405 | 1.667 | 0.096 |
X5 | 0.000 | 0.536 | 0.592 | 0.000 | 0.756 | 0.450 | 0.000 | 0.684 | 0.494 |
X6 | 0.024 | 1.954 | 0.051 | -0.041 | -3.306 | 0.001 | 0.014 | 1.360 | 0.174 |
X7 | 1.170 | 2.086 | 0.037 | -0.471 | -1.117 | 0.264 | 0.897 | 2.297 | 0.022 |
X8 | 1.052 | 1.158 | 0.247 | 1.123 | 1.437 | 0.151 | 0.966 | 1.384 | 0.167 |
P_R2 | 0.3623 | 0.1670 | 0.2482 | ||||||
LL | -28.2898 | -43.2321 | -44.4614 | ||||||
N | 52 | 55 | 55 | ||||||
Z is statistical quantity,P is probability of significant; P_R2 is Pseudo-R2,LL is Log likelihood,N is quantity of sample. |
3.2.1.Factors of individual characters
The variables denote individual’s age, education, political visage and numbers of family member. In all three regression model, most of the variables are not significantly (table 3). However, meanings from economic point of view are clear. For example, when village cadres’ are getting old, there is an inverse relationship between age and their level of job-satisfaction , evaluation of job-difficulty and will of job retaining. In China,rural society, economy and institutions are changing tremendously, but old village cadres could use their experiences and have old fogy conceptions, they often animadvert on nowadays’ things. They think village public affaires are more difficult to do in present than they were done in past(Ning etal.2005).
There is an inverse relationship between education years and their job satisfaction level , evaluation of job-difficulty and will of job retaining, because the village cadres who have more education years would have more chances to develop other occupations, especially in non-agriculture businesses. In other words, the more education years the village cadres have, the more opportunity costs they would get. In conclude, they get less incentive from village cadres’ positions.
In regression model, coefficients of the variable of the village cadres’ political visage are positive numbers in the level of job’s satisfaction model (table 3). Those mean that the village cadres could have high level of their job-satisfaction if they are members of Communist Party. Therefore, the village cadres’ working positive could be improved and they have more strength of cohesion in their cadres’ teams if there are more members of Communist Party in them. However, in the models of the evaluation of job-difficulties and the will of job retaining, some regression coefficients of the village cadres’ political visage are negative. The reasons may be that there are conflicts between two administrant organizations because there are a branch of Communist Party and a villager committee in a village. The Party’s branches in villages are skeleton organizations of Communist Party and managed by towns’ Party organizations. The villager committees are voted by villagers according to The Law of Villagers’ Organizations. The two organizations have powers to govern villages, but there is no clear division for their works, so there always are conflicts between them(He,2000b).The conflicts add the level of village cadres’ working difficulties and less their will of job retaining(Ning and Qu,2006). Therefore, new village management models should be considered in order to improve village cadres’ enthusiasm.
3.2.2.Factors of Wage
In the model of the level of job satisfaction, coefficient of the variable of village cadres’ nominal wages (X5) is null (table 3). It demonstrates the incentive of the village cadres’ nominal salary is not significant. The reason is that the levels of the village cadres’ salary are regulated and paid by their superior governments, local governments. Peng and Zhang (2003) also proved that there was no significant relativity between the levels of the village cadres’ nominal salary and their actual workload. The gaps among the village cadres’ workload are quite large. The reason is that the gaps of villages’ population and land are big. For example, there are over 10,000 people in some villages and on
Village cadres’ salaries usually are not paid fully. On
3.2.3.Factor of Social Reputation
In the two models of the level of job-satisfaction and will of job retaining, the regression coefficients of the variable of social reputation (X7) are not on
3.2.4.Factor of institute
From 1990’s, China has carried out a series of new institutes in villages. For example, villagers’ council, democratic monetary organization, the system of so-called ‘on
The contributions of the effects of the institutes implemented to the village cadres’ incentive can be seen in table 3. Although the variable of the system is not significant in statistical view, it could improve the level of village cadres’ satisfaction and their will of job-retaining if the effects of the institutes implemented are becoming better. At the meanwhile, the level of village cadres’ working difficulties will be improved. There are four reasons .(1)The institutes that are well-implemented could reduce possible relationships by misunderstanding between cadres and villagers due to system drawbacks.(2)By carrying the standard systems ,Village cadres can have clear anticipations of their work. It could decrease their anxieties and uneasiness which is caused by instable policies. (3)Well done the village systems can distinguish the powers and the duties between the village branches of Party and village governments ,then it could adjust or even reduce the conflicts between the two organizations. So the working effects of the two organizations could be improved and village cadres will have better feelings in self-identities and ascriptions to organizations and their jobs.(4)In short term, the systems may cause some troubles or inconveniences, because village cadres’ passing experiences and styles maybe can not fit with villages’ new conditions. The maladjustment will disappear as village cadres know the systems well and get accustomed to the systems ( Wang, 2001).
4. Further Demonstrations:experimenting scene investigation
In order to prove the result in section three further, a series of da
Table 4 The result of simulation experiment
Item | Sample number | affirmation | possible | impossible |
Raise village cadres’ wage at10% | 84 | 22(26.2%) | 46(54.8%) | 16(19.0%) |
Let village cadres learn in training classes or in universities | 63 | 23(36.5%) | 17(27.0%) | 23(36.5%) |
Add village cadres’ mission of levying tax from villagers | 54 | 7(13.0%) | 9(16.7%) | 38(70.4%) |
Villagers have rights to estimate their cadres | 62 | 20(32.3%) | 35(56.5%) | 7(11.3%) |
The cadres who didn’t fulfill their mission of levying tax are punished by higher fine | 58 | 12(20.7%) | 21(36.2%) | 25(43.1%) |
Village cadres are supervised by officials appointed by town government | 51 | 20(39.2%) | 22(43.1%) | 9(17.6%) |
Year-salary is implemented and paid by superior government | 85 | 46(54.1%) | 35(41.2%) | 4(4.7%) |
The system of opening village affairs is carried strictly | 64 | 38(59.4%) | 23(35.9%) | 3(4.7%) |
Supervising institutions consisted of villagers are founded | 55 | 30(54.5%) | 24(43.6%) | 1(1.8%) |
Increase village cadres’ power | 55 | 16(29.1%) | 29(52.7%) | 10(18.2%) |
Note: Sample number is the number of the village cadres who answer the questions
The below conclusions can be seen from the experiment.
First, there is no evidence showing that village cadres’ positive could be improved by raising their nominal wages. However, their positive could be improved significantly if their compensation as year salary are paid by superior governments. The reason is that village cadres’ wages are often defaulted. For example, in Changwu countryside, village cadres’ wages have been not paid for nine years in some villages. Therefore, the conclusion is demonstrated in the models of the section three: Cashing village cadres’ wages has more effective to improve their positive than raising their nominal wages does. In village cadres symposia we held, they all care of village cadres’ year salary. They thought their salary should be paid by county’s governments as town governments ’ finance were usually not enough .
Second, the variable that is similar with village cadres’ social reputation is village cadres’ power. The result of experimenting scene investigation demonstrates that 29.1 percent village cadres affirm their positive can be improved by increasing their power, 18.2 percent village cadres do not agree with that, and 52.7% percent village cadres’ ideas are not clear. Therefore, the effect of increasing village cadres’ power to improve their positive is unknown.
Third, in village management systems, the village cadres think village cadres’ positive can be improved by setting up supervise organizations, implementing opening village affaires strictly and villagers participating in valuating village cadres’ work achievements.
Fourth, in village cadres’ development, the variable of “letting village cadres learn in training classes or in universities” is used in the simulation experiment. The result of the experiment demonstrates that the effect of improving village cadres’ positive is limited or unclear by giving village cadres chances to study.
Finally, village cadres’ positive could not be improved or be less by adding their tasks and town governments intensifying domination to them. In the experimenting scene investigation, the village cadres told clearly that it is impossible to improve their work enthusiasm by adding their mission of levying tax from villagers and increasing fine to the cadres if they do not finish their missions. The effect of improving village cadres’ enthusiasm by town governments appointing officials to supervise them was smaller than by standardizing villages’ institutions, such as setting up supervision organizations, implementing the system of opening village affaires strictly and villagers participating in valuating village cadres’ work achievements.
From the da
Table 5 Village cadres’ enthusiasm and factors
| Enthusiasm | |||
Degree of job satisfaction | Degree of job difficulty | Will of job retaining | ||
Factor | Salary(percentage in cashing) | +,★★★ | -,★★★★★ | +,★★ |
Social reputation(including treatment in politics) | +,★★★ | -,★★ | +,★★★★ | |
Effect of village institutions implemented | +,★ | +,★★ | +,★★ | |
Developmental chances(be trained) | ? | ? | ? |
Note:“+”positive enthusiasm;“-”negative enthusiasm;“?”dark;“★”degree, the more, the higher degree .
5. Conclusions
The paper analyses the factors that impact village cadres’ incentive to their enthusiasm with regression model based on collected da
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刊于《China-USA Business Review》(USA),2008(4),P4-14.
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